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Compared to training in general, workplace training
is received while in employment, and is usually but
not exclusively provided by the employer. Figure 1
shows the differences in average training incidence
across European countries, Anglo-Saxon countries
and some countries of Eastern Europe. The figure
plots both average training participation and aver-
age annual hours of training per employee. We no-
tice that the US does not perform “better” than all
European countries, because the UK, France and
Scandinavian countries have both higher participa-
tion and higher annual hours of training.The rest of
Europe, including the countries in the “olive belt”
(Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), does “worse”
than the US, and is somewhat closer to the new
entries from Eastern Europe.1While these indicators
need to be considered with care, due to the mea-
surement problems which reduce comparability,they
reveal that Europe is very heterogeneous when it
comes to training outcomes.
On average, the entire cost of three-quarters of
training courses is directly paid by employers, and
there is little evidence that employees indirectly pay
through lower wages. Large and innovative firms
train more than small and non-innovative firms,with
the UK being the only European country where this
does not hold. Cross-country variation among large
and innovative firms is, however, small. Therefore,
the lower average training incidence in countries
located in the Southern “olive belt” is correlated
both to their larger share of small firms and to the
fact that these firms train relatively less than firms of
similar size in Northern Europe.
In Europe, as in the US, training increases with edu-
cational attainment and the skill-intensity of occupa-
tions, and decreases with age.The age-training gap is
negatively correlated with the employment rate of
older workers,reflecting either the impact of training
on older workers’ employability or their incentive to
stay on rather than retire, and invest in their skills.
Women take more training than men, but essentially
because they pay for their own training more often,
while firms do not appear to accommodate their
greater demand for training. Importantly, women
tend to receive less employer-sponsored training
than men when they are young and have more fre-
quent career interruptions due to childrearing. On
average, temporary workers are trained less often.
After netting out observable individual characteris-
tics, country effects account for almost one-half of
the explained variation in training participation
across Europe – net of Germany.2Without doubt,part
of this variation reflects measure-
ment error and cross-country dif-
ferences in definitions and per-
ceptions of training.For instance,
since training registered in em-
ployer and employee surveys is
typically formal, significant epi-
sodes of informal training are
not counted, which is especially
problematic for small firms,
where a lot of informal training
arguably takes place. However,
this residual cross-country varia-
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1The somewhat surprising relative position of Germany in this dia-
gram can be explained by the fact that we are considering only indi-
viduals aged 25–64; by so doing, we exclude most apprenticeship
training.
2 Germany is excluded because of the
quality of the data.the institutional and social framework, in govern-
ment policies and in the macroeconomic conditions.
In this essay, I investigate the relationship between
labour and product market institutions and training
outcomes. It has been widely recognized that institu-
tions have an impact on unemployment and produc-
tivity.I ask whether they also have an impact on train-
ing outcomes. I start by reviewing the theoretical and
empirical literature and move on to describe the main
features of my empirical investigation. I then discuss
the results and draw my main conclusions.3
Training and labour market institutions: what does
the theory have to say?
Institutions play an important role in the theory of
training,because minimum wages and trade unions –
inter alia – can affect the wedge between wages and
marginal productivity. I consider in turn the effects
of trade unions, minimum wages, product market
regulation and school design.All of these institutions
are likely to vary across OECD countries.
Unions
The channels through which union collective bargain-
ing can affect training and pay are potentially quite
complex,and it is not immediately obvious that union-
ism will be associated with positive or negative returns
to training. The implications of unionism for training
and pay depend, inter alia, on the degree of competi-
tion in the labour market and on whether the union
effect on training is indirect (through the wage struc-
ture) or direct (through the negotiation of training).
Some studies argue that, where wages are set collec-
tively by trade unions in an otherwise competitive
labour market, wage dispersion is reduced and
incentives to invest in general training at the work-
place are distorted.This is because union wages can-
not be lowered during training and increased after
training to allow workers to bear the costs and ben-
efits of general training. In imperfectly competitive
labour markets, unions have ambiguous effects on
the pay returns to training.In Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999), for instance, unions set wages and the firm
determines training. Their model predicts that un-
ionism is associated with increased firm-financed
transferable training.
When union utility increases with respect to wages
and job security or the employment of its members,
unions may ensure that covered workers receive high-
er wages and greater job security by directly inter-
vening in training provision, for example, by making
sure that workers’ skills are enhanced through more
training. Strong unions might therefore be more will-
ing to negotiate better training opportunities for cov-
ered workers, especially in non-competitive product
markets in which the available surplus is larger.
Where unions improve worker morale and organisa-
tion at the workplace, labour turnover may be re-
duced (Freeman and Medoff 1984). Union-covered
firms may therefore have greater incentives to pro-
vide training because they are less likely to lose high-
ly productive trained workers. Through this mecha-
nism, unionism may be associated with increased
training and productivity, and consequently wages.
Finally,in firms that become unionised,management
may respond to higher union wages by more careful-
ly vetting new hires to obtain a better quality work-
force.This vetting might also involve induction train-
ing. From the supply side, better quality or more
motivated workers might self-select into unions jobs
if the training opportunities and returns are higher in
the union-covered sector. If unions bargain directly
over training as well as wages, only workers able to
benefit from such training will wish to queue for
union jobs, or will be offered such jobs.
Minimum wages
With competitive labour markets, human capital the-
ory predicts that the introduction of a minimum wage
reduces investment in training by covered workers,
who can no longer contribute to training costs
through lower wages. But if the labour market for the
low paid is imperfectly competitive or workers are
credit-constrained, a minimum wage can increase in-
vestment in the general component of training.Why is
this the case? The basic rationale is provided by oli-
gopsonistic models, which predict that firms may pay
for general training.The oligopsonistic labour market
introduces a “wedge” between wages and marginal
product.And it can be shown that the introduction of
a minimum wage also acts as a type of wedge between
wages and marginal productivity. Thus it can actually
increase general training over a range of human capi-
tal and induce employers to train their unskilled
workers (Acemoglu and Pischke 2003).
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Product market competition and deregulation
Deregulation increases competition in the product
market and can affect training in a number of ways.
First, deregulation influences real wages and profits
after training, and reduces rents. Second, the higher
competition induced by deregulation increases pro-
ductivity by forcing firms to improve efficiency and
to innovate.If innovation and skills are complements
– see Acemoglu (1997) – firms have a higher incen-
tive to train. By affecting the entry of firms, deregu-
lation also contributes to local agglomeration effects,
which might discourage the investment in training by
strengthening the risk of poaching.4 Third, the rela-
tive bargaining power of workers can fall because of
the higher risk of involuntary turnover and plant clo-
sure associated with more product market competi-
tion.5 Rents increase, and training can rise as well.
Schooling institutions
The variation in school design – especially of sec-
ondary schools – can affect training outcomes, given
the complementarity between education and train-
ing. Countries differ in the degree of stratification of
secondary education and in the importance of track-
ing. The design of secondary schooling systems
varies considerably across European countries, and
an important dimension of such variation is the rela-
tive importance of vocational and general education.
While comprehensive schooling systems which mix
general and vocational education are typical of the
UK and Scandinavia, stratified systems, with a much
more marked separation of the vocational and gen-
eral track,are used in Austria and Germany.The rest
of the major European countries lie somewhere in
between.6 It is an open question as to whether a
more stratified schooling system is conducive to
higher training outcomes than a more comprehen-
sive system. If vocational schools in stratified educa-
tional systems produce very specialized skills that
become rapidly obsolete in the presence of technical
progress, more training might be required to update
existing skills to match the new technical blueprints.
On the other hand, comprehensive schools could
produce skills that are too general, and which
require additional training to become operational.
Previous empirical literature
The empirical papers investigating the different
aspects of the relationship between unions and train-
ing provide mixed results.Among the first studies in
the US, Barron and co-authors (1987) use data from
a survey of US employers and find that the propor-
tion of non-supervisory workers covered by collec-
tive bargaining has a significant negative effect on
total training. On the contrary, Lynch (1992) finds
evidence of a positive effect of unions on training
in the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY).
Beside the Lynch’s study, additional evidence of a
positive union effect is provided among others by
Veum (1995), Arulampalam and Booth (1998), and
Booth Francesconi and Zoega (2003). The latter
study investigates the impact of union coverage on
work-related training and finds that union-covered
British men are more likely to receive training and
also receive more days of training than workers with
no coverage. A positive union effect is also the key
result of a recent investigation of unions and training
in German data by Dustmann and Schonberg
(2004). On the other hand, Black and Lynch (1998)
find no link between unions and training.
The available empirical evidence on the effects of
minimum wages on training is also rather inconclu-
sive, with recent studies in the United States and the
United Kingdom reporting contradictory findings.
Recall that in perfectly competitive labour markets,
the introduction of a minimum wage reduces train-
ing,because some workers are not capable of financ-
ing training by accepting lower wages. Conversely,
when labour markets are characterized by monop-
sonistic power, minimum wages may increase em-
ployer-provided training of low paid workers.
Early research by Leighton and Mincer (1981) finds
that age-earnings profiles are significantly flatter
among workers whose wages are bound by the mini-
mum wage,which is interpreted as suggesting that an
increase in the minimum wage significantly reduces
on-the-job training. In sharp contrast, Lazear and
Miller (1981) find no statistically significant relation-
ship between the slope of age-earnings profiles and
an indicator of whether the minimum wage is binding
or not. However, more recent research by Grossberg
and Sicilian (1999) shows that the effect of minimum
wages on wage growth could be unrelated to the ef-
fect produced on training. As suggested by Acemoglu
4 See Brunello and Gambarotto (2007) and Brunello and De Paola
(2004).
5 See Bassanini and Brunello (2006) for more details.
6 See Brunello and Giannini (2004) and Brunello, Giannini and
Ariga (2004) for a discussion of these issues.and Pischke (2003) minimum wages eliminate the
lower tail of the wage distribution and by so doing
flatten the slope of the age-earning profile.This effect
is independent of the impact of minimum wages on
training. Leighton and Mincer (1981) and Neumark
and Wascher (2001), using data on individual work-
ers, consider the relationship between the variation
of minimum wages across the US states and the
investment in training and find that the more binding
the minimum wage is, the less likely a worker is to
receive on-the-job training.
A widespread concern with the recent diffusion of
flexible employment practices, such as temporary
labour contracts is that these contracts may be detri-
mental to economic performance because temporary
workers are less likely to be trained. Arulampalam
and Booth (1998) investigate the relationship bet-
ween employment flexibility and training using UK
data, and find that workers on temporary contracts
are less likely to receive work-related training.Quite
in contrast, recent work by Autor (2004) on tempo-
rary help firms in the US shows that almost one
quarter of temporary help supply firms have re-
ceived skills training as temporaries.Training in this
context not only provides skills but also operates as
a screening and a self-sorting device.
The relationship between product market competi-
tion and training is significantly less studied in both
the theoretical and empirical literature. In the only
empirical investigation we are aware of Autor
(2004) presents evidence of a negative and statisti-
cally significant correlation between the Herfindahl
index, a measure of product market concentration,
and the training provided by temporary help firms
in the US. The evidence on the relationship be-
tween firing costs, employment protection and
training is also rather limited. Bishop (1991) is one
study in the area, which reports that the likelihood
and amount of formal training are higher at firms
where firing a worker is more difficult. Acemoglu
and Pischke (2000) argue that there are comple-
mentarities between regulation regimes and train-
ing systems, and that reducing firing costs and
increasing employment flexibility could reduce the
incentives to train.
There is substantial evidence that the quantity of
education and training are complements (Leuven
[2005] for a review), and there is also evidence that
the strength of this complementarity depends on
whether training is provided on-the-job or off-the-
job (Ariga and Brunello 2006). To our knowledge,
no empirical research has been done so far on the
relationship between the quality of education and
training. Since quality depends on the design of
schooling institutions, an important empirical ques-
tion is which institutions are more conducive to
work-related training.
The traditional way of looking at the relationship
between pension benefits and training is that
deferred payments – such as pensions – reduce
turnover, increase incentives, and therefore allow
firms to recoup the costs of their investments in
training (Lazear 1979).This view suggests that there
is a positive relationship between employer-provid-
ed training and the generosity of the pension plans
designed by firms. If we focus on workers approach-
ing retirement age, however, we notice that these
employees face the choice of retiring versus continu-
ing work and investing in further training.The incen-
tive to stay and train is likely to be higher in coun-
tries were the implicit tax on continuing work is
lower.This tax is defined as minus the change in pen-
sion wealth from remaining in the labour market
during a given period of time (Duval 2004).
Many European countries have recently changed or
are considering reforming the pension system,with a
view to increasing its sustainability in the face of per-
sistent ageing. One concern raised by these policies
is that a postponement of retirement age might in-
crease the unemployment rate of older workers,who
are unlikely to receive the training needed to stay
longer in the labour market.To cope with this, some
countries in Europe have in place early retirement
schemes, which facilitate the transition of older dis-
missed workers from work to retirement.These sys-
tems are expensive for the taxpayer and do not con-
tribute to increasing the participation rate of older
workers. In principle, however, the expectation of
less generous retirement benefits should positively
affect the training of senior workers – both employ-
er and employee-provided – by increasing the
expected length of working life after the investment,
and the time available to recoup the costs of the
investment.
As in the case of the relationship between school
design and training, I am not aware of any empirical
research which has investigated whether the gen-
erosity of mainly public pension schemes has a sig-
nificant effect on the training incidence of senior
workers.
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Empirical investigation: the data
My data on individual training events are drawn
from the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP),7 Waves II to VIII (1995 to 2001). The
ECHP is an attractive source of information because
it covers a significant number of European countries
with a commonly designed questionnaire.I only con-
sider individuals (i) aged between 25 and 60 years
and working at least 15 hours per week; (ii) not
employed in agriculture; (iii) present in at least two
consecutive waves; (iv) not in apprenticeships or in
special employment training schemes.
Since the reference period of each wave may overlap
with the period of the previous wave, I run the risk of
double counting training spells twice.Rather than los-
ing information or adjusting counts in an ad-hoc way,
I prefer to ignore double counting. There is also the
problem of omitted spells, which appears to be partic-
ularly serious for Germany. Since the data for
Germany also miss important information on employ-
er-provided training, as well as on industry affiliation,
I have dropped this country from the sample.8
I consider all training, independently of whether it is
defined as general or as firm-specific, or as paid by
the employer or by the employee.As documented in
Bassanini et al. (2005) average training incidence is
higher in countries with a higher percentage of the
population having at least a high school diploma.
Not only the quantity but also the quality of educa-
tion matters. One important area where European
secondary schools differ is the degree of stratifica-
tion or tracking. Compared to the US, where track-
ing consists of ability grouping within the same com-
prehensive schooling system,stratification in Europe
occurs mainly by separating students into vocational
and general tracks, with different degrees of osmosis
between tracks. Hannah, Raffe and Smyth (1996)
and OECD (2004) classify countries into three
groups, depending on the degree of stratification of
school curricula: a high stratification group, which
includes Germany, Austria, Belgium and the Neth-
erlands;a low stratification group,with the UK, Spain
and Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark and
Finland); an intermediate group, with the rest of
Europe, including France and Italy, which lies
between these two extremes. In systems with high
stratification, students are divided relatively early
into separate tracks, and develop specific and rela-
tively narrow skills in the vocational track. In sys-
tems with low stratification, tracking takes place
later, if ever, and students receive a broader and
more versatile education.
The data on labour and product market institutions
come from a variety of sources. Time-varying union
density is from the OECD database. This variable
has been used in the literature as a proxy of union
influence, mainly because of the availability of time-
varying data. An important drawback, however, is
that the variable of interest in the empirical analysis
is union coverage, which might be poorly related to
union density. Only in half a dozen OECD eco-
nomies with predominantly company bargaining do
the two go closely together. France, where coverage
is high but density low, is a clear example of poor
correlation. It follows that, when the extension of
union agreements is high, changes in union density
are not as informative of union influence on wages,
employment and training decisions as when exten-
sion is low.
The OECD has developed a measure of the legal or
administrative extension of union agreements.
Extension makes a collective agreement generally
binding within an industrial sector, covering all
employees who are not members of its signatory par-
ties.This measure is a dummy equal to one for coun-
tries where extension is low (Denmark, the UK and
Sweden), two for countries with medium extension
(Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Finland) and
three for countries with high extension (Belgium,
France, Spain, Portugal and Austria).9 Since varia-
tions of union density are a good measure of union
influence and coverage when extension is low, we
define a new variable – the interaction of density
with a dummy equal to one for the countries with
low extension, and to zero for the remaining coun-
tries. This is equivalent to restricting the analysis of
the relationship between training and union density
to these countries.
I characterize the flexibility of the employment rela-
tionship in Europe with three variables – the index
of stringency of employment protection legislation
(EPL) for regular and temporary workers and the
share of temporary workers in the labour force.10
7 The December 2003 release of these data is available at the
Department of Economics, University of Padua, under contract n.
14/99.
8 The German data in the ECHP are derived from GSOEP and
exclude many shorter training spells.
9 See OECD (2004b).
10 While the index of employment protection for regular workers
focuses mainly on firing restrictions,the index for temporary work-
ers considers mainly hiring restrictions.The data for these variables are also from the OECD
database. I use the index of product market regula-
tion developed by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003),
which measures the stringency of anti-competitive
product market regulation – varying between 0 and
6 from the least to the most stringent.Since the indi-
cator covers the period from the late eighties to
1998, I minimize the loss of information by associat-
ing product market regulation in year t-3 to training
between year t-1 and year t.
I capture the institutions affecting the retirement
decision with the implicit tax rate on continued
work.This indicator measures the change in pension
or social wealth from remaining in the labour market
during the five years from age 60 to age 64 and is
defined as minus this change divided by length of the
interval. Unfortunately, it has been estimated by the
OECD only for the year 2003 and does not include
Greece (Duval 2004). For the purposes of this study,
I shall assume hereafter that the indicator proxies in
a satisfactory way expected pension benefits during
the second part of the 1990.
The table summarizes the data on time-varying insti-
tutions by classifying countries according to whether
the relevant variable has increased, remained con-
stant or increased between 1995 and 2001. Union
density has declined in all the countries with low
extension of union contracts; the share of temporary
workers has increased in all countries, with the
notable exceptions of Denmark, Ireland and Fin-
land, where it has declined. The index of employ-
ment protection of regular employees has remained
constant in the large majority of countries, increased
in Portugal and declined in Denmark, Spain and
Finland; the same index for temporary workers has
declined in half of the sample and remained constant
in the rest; product market regulation has declined
across the board;finally,the expenditure on R&D as
a share of GDP has increased in most countries but
declined in France, Italy and the UK.
The empirical results
I group individual data by country, year, education
(college versus less than college) and age (24 to 49
and 50 to 59) and estimate by weighted least squares
an empirical specification where the dependent vari-
able is the logistic transformation of the proportion
of trained employees in each subgroup. I estimate
this specification on ECHP data for 13 countries11
and the period 1995-2001. Compared to estimates
which use individual data, aggregation over groups
has the advantage of reducing individual hetero-
geneity and measurement error in the dependent
variable.
Given the host of country and time specific factors
which potentially affect training, I need to control
for country and time effects with country and time
dummies. This implies that I can estimate the rela-
tionship between training and labour market institu-
tions only if the latter vary both across countries and
over the available time span. Notice that the varia-
tion of training across countries and over time can
also be due to confounding factors, which operate at
the same level of aggregation of the selected institu-
tional variables. Failure to control for these factors
could seriously bias my results.To
illustrate, suppose that training
incidence is affected by country-
specific technical progress, and
let this variable change over time.
By excluding measures of techni-
cal progress from the regression,
I run the risk of attributing its
effects on training to time-vary-
ing institutions.
The set of time-varying institu-
tions I consider includes union
density interacted with a dummy
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Changes of institutional andother indicators between 1995 and2001,
by country
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equal to 1 if the extension of union contracts is low,
the index of employment protection for regular and
temporary employees, the index of product market
regulation,12 the interaction between age in the
range 50 to 59 and the implicit tax on continued
work and the interactions between the share of
R&D expenditure on GDP, no college education – a
dummy equal to 1 for individuals with less than col-
lege education – and no tracking – a dummy equal to
zero for countries with a comprehensive secondary
school system. These two dummies are interacted
both separately and jointly with R&D expenditure.
The first interaction is expected to capture the disin-
centive effects on training of higher expected returns
from retirement. The second set of interactions
investigates whether the effects of technical innova-
tions – captured by the share of R&D expenditure
on GDP – vary with the level of educational attain-
ment and with the degree of tracking in secondary
schools.Technical change is likely to make narrowly
specialized skills obsolete, and it might be necessary
as a consequence to re-train more individuals with a
less versatile and narrower education than individu-
als with general skills. If this is the case, I expect the
relationship between technical progress and training
to be positive and stronger in countries where
schooling is more stratified.
There is substantial literature on skill-biased techni-
cal change (Katz and Autor [1999] for a review),
showing that new technological developments and
higher education are complements. Complementari-
ties between innovations and educational attainment
imply that new innovations increase the relative de-
mand for college graduates.If training and education
are also complements, an implication is that the ef-
fect of technical progress, captured by R&D expen-
diture, is likely to be stronger for individuals with
higher education.
Confounding factors include the country and time
specific unemployment rate, the share of temporary
workers in the labour force and the share of R&D
expenditure on GDP. The first two variables are
expected to capture cyclical effects and changes in the
composition of labour contracts, and the latter vari-
able to proxy technical progress. Ideally, we would
also like to include indicators which capture changes
in training policy, but the only closely related indica-
tor – the share of expenditure on active labour mar-
ket policies on GDP – includes almost entirely train-
ing subsidies paid out to the unemployed.
Given these premises, my key findings are:
• Training incidence increases with the unemploy-
ment rate, which supports the view that firms and
individuals engage more frequently in training
activities when the opportunity cost of training –
in terms of foregone production – is lower (Hall
2000). Training participation also increases with
total expenditure on R&D – measured as share of
GDP – and this effect is significantly lower for
college graduates, which suggests that the latter
require less training when innovations occur.
• The effect of union density on training – limited to
the countries with low extension of union contracts
– is very small and imprecisely estimated.Training
turns out to be lower when the share of temporary
workers in total employment increases.Therefore,
an increase in the flexibility of the employment
relationship associated with the introduction and
diffusion of temporary labour contracts reduces
the incentives of both parties to train. This effect,
however, is imprecisely estimated.
• Training incidence is lower when the degree of
employment protection of both regular workers
and temporary workers increases, although this
effect is statistically different from zero at the five
percent level of confidence only for the former.
How do I explain this? It is well known that em-
ployment protection is associated with firing costs,
and that these costs have both a transfer and a tax
component. While the transfer part could be un-
done by properly designed labour contracts, the
tax component is difficult to undo (Garibaldi and
Violante 2002).A common view in this literature
is that firing costs increase wages. According to
Lindbeck and Snower (1988),these costs increase
the bargaining power of insiders by sheltering
them from the competition of outsiders. How
could this affect training? By raising wages and
reducing profits.
An alternative explanation is selection. When fir-
ing costs are high,employers cannot easily dismiss
less able or less suitable regular employees and
therefore end up with a more heterogeneous regu-
lar labour force than employers who can more eas-
ily dismiss unsuitable employees. If training and
ability are complements, or if labour force hetero-
geneity imposes a negative firm-specific external-
12 This index ranges from 0 to 6 and measures the intensity of reg-
ulation with respect to: economic and administrative regulation,
tariff and other barriers, state control and public ownership, barri-
ers to entrepreneurship, impediments to trade and investment. See
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2002).ity on individual productivity, employers with a
more homogeneous regular labour force should
train more.
• Conditional on employment protection, training
incidence is lower when product market regula-
tion is higher.Therefore,liberalizing product mar-
kets do not damage training incentives, quite the
contrary.This evidence does not support the view
expressed by Gersbach and Schmutzler (2004)
that training should be higher when industrial
concentration is high and/or competitive intensity
is comparatively low,but is in line with the finding
by Autor (2004) that temporary help firms oper-
ating in more concentrated markets train more.
• I find that the interaction of age and the implicit
tax on continued work is negative and statistical-
ly significant. Therefore, the age-training profile
of workers in the 50–59 age group is reduced by
the expectation of better retirement benefits. An
implication of this finding is that pension reforms
which reduce the implicit tax on continuing work
for those between 60 and 64 are likely to increase
the training of senior employees. Thus, the con-
cerns about the labour market prospects for
senior workers which often accompany these re-
forms might be exaggerated to the extent that
these workers receive further training. As shown
by Bassanini (2006) additional training of senior
workers increases their employability.
• Finally, the interaction between R&D expendi-
ture on GDP and lack of secondary school track-
ing yields a negative and statistically significant
coefficient for individuals with less than college
education, suggesting that technical progress has
for these individuals a positive effect on training
where schooling is stratified and a negative effect
where schooling is comprehensive. This result
points to the possibility that the vocational skills
developed in stratified schools require more
training and updating in the face of technical
innovations. Therefore, countries with less strati-
fied schooling systems have workers endowed
with more versatile skills and that need less train-
ing to match newly developed techniques than
countries with more stratified education systems.
How big are the effects discussed above? It turns out
that a 10 percent increase in the share of R&D
expenditure is expected to raise the probability of
training for college graduates by 8.99 percent. The
Lisbon strategy sets at 3 percent the target share of
R&D expenditure on GDP, to be attained by 2010.
According to my estimates, this would require an
increase from the current European average of 1.4
percentage points,close to 87 percent from the base-
line. If such an increase could be attained, I expect
training participation to increase by 78.6 percent, a
substantial amount. The expected increase in the
probability of training is even higher for individuals
without a college degree, and depends on the nature
of the secondary school.
When evaluated at the sample mean values of
employment protection, my estimates suggest that a
10 percent increase in the degree of product market
regulation would reduce the probability of training
by 13.1 percent. Conversely, a 10 percent increase in
employment protection would reduce training inci-
dence by 4.91 percent in the case of regular workers
and by 1.05 percent in the case of temporary workers.
Conclusions
This essay started by asking whether product and
labour market institutions affect training. My empir-
ical investigation conclude that they do. In particu-
lar, I find that
• Product market regulation affects training nega-
tively and significantly.Therefore, more competi-
tion in the product market is conducive to higher
investment in training;
• Labour market flexibility affects training in a less
straightforward manner: on the one hand, the dif-
fusion of temporary contracts reduces the invest-
ment in training;on the other hand,the reduction
in the degree of employment protection increases
the provision of training, especially for regular
workers. Therefore, labour market reforms that
accelerate the diffusion of temporary contracts
and at the same time increase the protection of a
limited core of permanent employees produce
negative effects on the accumulation of human
capital taking place mainly in firms;
• Training incidence declines with age and is lower
than average for workers who have reached age
fifty.The decline is higher,ceteris paribus,in coun-
tries with a more generous pension system,
because the higher implicit tax on continuing
work at age 60 to 64 reduces the expected time
horizon required to recoup the costs of the invest-
ment. Therefore, pension reforms which reduce
the implicit tax are likely to have as a by-product
an increase in the training of senior workers;
CESifo DICE Report 4/2006 40
Research ReportsCESifo DICE Report 4/2006 41
Research Reports
• There is little evidence that union density matters
significantly for training. One reason could be
that our measure of unionism does not allow us to
fully capture the complexity of this relationship.
We have restricted union density to affect training
only in those countries where the extension of
union contracts is low, and cannot say much on
the effects of unions on training in the remaining
countries;
• Training and investment in research and develop-
ment are complements,but the degree of comple-
mentarity is lower for college graduates, possibly
because the latter have sufficient skills and do not
need to be trained or re-trained to be able to cope
with innovations;
• Secondary school design has an impact on the
relationship between innovative activity and
training: when schooling is more comprehensive,
high school graduates require less training to
adapt to technical progress.
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